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Abstract
A small, but growing, body of literature searches for evidence of non-Keynesian
effects of fiscal contractions. That is, some evidence exists that large fiscal con-
tractions stimulate short-run economic activity. Our paper continues this research
effort by systematically examining the effects, if any, of unusual fiscal events - ei-
ther non-Keynesian results within a Keynesian model or Keynesian results within
a neoclassical model – on short-run economic activity. We examine this issue
within three separate models – a St. Louis equation, a Hall-type consumption
equation, and a growth accounting equation. Our empirical findings are mixed,
and do not provide strong systematic support for the view that unusually large fis-
cal contractions/expansions reverse the effects of normal fiscal events. Moreover,
we find only limited evidence that trigger points are empirically important.
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 A small, but growing, body of literature searches for evidence of non-
Keynesian effects of fiscal contractions. That is, some evidence exists that large 
fiscal contractions stimulate short-run economic activity. Our paper continues 
this research effort by systematically examining the effects, if any, of unusual 
fiscal events – either non-Keynesian results within a Keynesian model or 
Keynesian results within a neoclassical model -- on short-run economic activity. 
The authors  examine this issue within three separate models -- a St. Louis 
equation, a Hall-type consumption equation, and a growth accounting equation. 
Our empirical findings are mixed, and do not provide strong systematic support 
for the view that unusually large fiscal contractions/expansions reverse the effects 
of normal fiscal events. Moreover, the authors find only limited evidence that 
trigger points are empirically important.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the past quarter century, nearly all OECD countries undertook at least one large 
fiscal contraction to deal with high levels and rapid growth of public debt. Although such fiscal 
contractions were necessary to curb the growth of public debt, significant concern emerged that 
such actions could weaken economic growth in the short run. Those concerns seemed justified 
when growth slowed in many cases, sometimes resulting in recessions. But in others – most 
notably the fiscal contractions in Denmark (1983- 1986) and in Ireland (1987-1989), growth 
accelerated. Those experiences, as well as the contractionary fiscal expansion in Sweden in the 
early 1990s, brings into question the conventional wisdom about the effect of fiscal actions 
meant to stabilize cyclical fluctuations. They also generated a small, but growing, body of 
empirical literature looking for evidence of so-called "non-Keynesian" effects on short-term 
growth (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990, 1995; Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997; McDermott and 
Wescott, 1996; Perotti, 1999; Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2000). That literature concluded 
that under certain conditions large fiscal contractions stimulate rather than retard short-term 
growth. 
Those studies frequently distinguish between normal and unusual times -- where fiscal 
regimes, as measured by the change in the cyclically adjusted primary deficit, change 
dramatically. In some cases, the idea of a fiscal crisis also comes into play. In large part, 
however, differences in fiscal policy regimes were determined on an ad hoc basis. While the 
adopted definitions of regime changes are generally reasonable, the results regarding non-
Keynesian effects may be sensitive to the definition of a regime change. 
The authors use more statistically based methods for determining changes in fiscal 
regimes, and empirically test for the significance of more types of fiscal crises – or so-called 
“trigger points.” After considering Hamilton’s (1994, Ch. 22) procedure for empirically 
determining regime changes, the authors use a procedure previously employed by Miller (1986, 
1989) in his study of short-run money demand shifts, because of sample size limitations.. 
After identifying different fiscal policy regimes and associated trigger points in 19 OECD 
countries, the authors use that information in three alternative regression equations explaining 
economic activity with pooled time-series, cross-section data. First, the authors estimate a St. 
Louis equation similar to Batten and Hafer (1983). Second, the authors estimate a Martingale 
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equation for consumption similar to those estimated by Hall (1978) and Flavin (1981). Finally, 
the authors estimate a growth accounting equation similar to Levin and Renault (1992), Barro 
(1991), and Miller and Russek (1997). 
The existing empirical literature that searches for non-Keynesian outcomes generally 
estimates a consumption function. The authors provide similar estimates based on Hall’s 
specification as well as on a St. Louis equation specification. Our third empirical analysis is 
based on a growth accounting specification that offers the first test of the Bertola-Drazen (1993) 
hypothesis that unusual fiscal events may turn neo-classical outcomes into Keynesian outcomes. 
With few exceptions, our findings do not provide overwhelming support for strong 
unusual fiscal outcomes. Unusual fiscal outcomes fall into two categories – non-Keynesian 
outcomes within a Keynesian model and Keynesian outcomes within a neo-classical model. 
Moreover, the authors find mixed evidence that non-Keynesian outcomes are more likely for 
government spending cuts than for tax hikes. Finally, the evidence does not indicate that trigger 
points matter much empirically. In sum, the evidence on unusual fiscal outcomes is idiosyncratic 
rather than systematic. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II briefly outlines the possible theoretical 
channels of non-Keynesian effects within a Keynesian model and non-classical effects within a 
classical model. Section III reviews the existing empirical literature, while section IV describes 
our method for determining changes in fiscal policy regimes. Section V presents some 
descriptive statistics for fiscal contractions lasting at least three years. Sections VI, VII, and VIII, 
respectively, describe our data, our estimation technique, and our empirical results. Conclusions 
are contained in section IX. 
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II. THEORY 
The standard textbook Keynesian model implies that government tax hikes and spending 
cuts both reduce the pace of short-term economic activity through their adverse effects on 
aggregate demand. Those effects are weakened somewhat through the associated declines in 
interest and exchange rates that cushion the fall in domestic demand by raising private wealth, 
and stimulate net exports by depreciating the domestic currency. 
In contrast with the standard Keynesian model, some economists argue that under certain 
conditions, fiscal contractions stimulate rather than retard short-term economic activity. First, an 
extraordinary fall in interest rates in response to the fiscal contraction and its effect on expected 
future financial market conditions can generate non-Keynesian effects. Second, a decline in 
expected future tax liabilities can boost the economy. Finally, the improvements in international 
competitiveness that result from lower labor costs can stimulate the economy. Those lower labor 
costs follow when a reduction in the government wage bill leads to reduced wages in general. 
A few studies argue that certain pre-existing fiscal conditions are necessary before fiscal 
contractions will have reversed effects. Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999), for example, 
propose critically high or rising levels of public debt as necessary preconditions or triggers. In 
those models, the sign of the effect of a fiscal contraction depends on initial fiscal conditions. On 
the other hand, Bertola and Drazen (1993) describe how expectations are linked to "trigger 
points" defined as critically high levels of government consumption relative to GDP. 
Sutherland (1997) constructs a model where a fiscal expansion has usual Keynesian 
effects at low levels of public debt because a tax increase is not imminently expected when a 
debt crisis is not present. At high levels of debt, however, a further increase in public debt is 
expected to trigger a large tax hike in the near future that outweighs the stimulative effect of the 
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fiscal expansion. In that case, a non-Keynesian response of private consumption occurs. 
Perotti (1999) presents a model where a fiscal adjustment has typical Keynesian effects at 
low levels of public debt, but non-Keynesian effects at high levels. The non-Keynesian effect 
occurs at high levels of public debt because the negative income effect on liquidity-constrained 
consumers of a tax hike is outweighed by the positive wealth effect of lower expected future 
taxes for those not liquidity constrained. Similarly, a cut in government consumption reduces 
disposable income. But at high levels of public debt, it has more of a positive effect on wealth 
because of the fall in expected future taxes and tax distortions. 
Finally, Bertola and Drazen (1993) develop a neo-classical model where an increase in 
government consumption has typical neo-classical effects on private consumption at low levels 
of government consumption. But at high levels, a further increase in government consumption 
stimulates private consumption because it is expected to trigger a substantial downward 
adjustment of government consumption (and hence taxes) in the near future. In that case of high 
government consumption, the relationship between changes in current public and private 
consumption reflects Keynesian thinking. 
In sum, Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999) both develop models where Keynesian 
effects emerge in normal times while non-Keynesian effects emerge only in unusual times. That 
view lies behind much of the empirical literature discussed in the next section. Bertola and 
Drazen (1993) stand this thinking on its head as non-Keynesian (neo-classical) results emerge in 
normal times while Keynesian effects emerge in unusual times. 
III. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL NON-KEYNESIAN FINDINGS 
The empirical literature focuses on the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy and reports 
several conclusions, including the following. First, large fiscal contractions do not necessarily 
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cause recessions. Second, large and persistent fiscal contractions that succeed in putting the 
public debt-GDP ratio on a downward trend are more likely than others to produce positive, or 
non-Keynesian, effects on short-term growth. Finally, fiscal contractions achieved by cuts in 
government spending are more effective in reducing the ratio of public debt to GDP than are 
those achieved through tax increases. 
The empirical literature also reports some inconsistent findings. First, differences of 
opinion exist regarding whether the size or the composition of a fiscal contraction is more 
important. Second, some studies emphasize faster growth of private consumption while others 
stress private investment. Finally, net exports are important in some studies, but not in others. 
Such differences in findings may reflect how large and persistent fiscal contractions are 
defined. Definitions vary across studies in terms of the length and strength of a fiscal adjustment, 
and sometimes depend on what happens to the public debt-GDP ratio. As a result, changes in 
fiscal regimes do not always occur in the same years across studies, and so may associate with 
different economic developments. 
In one of the early studies, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) report “descriptive” regressions 
showing that cuts in government spending sometimes positively, rather than negatively, 
associate with short-term growth. In those regressions, which are based on 1973-1989 data for 10 
OECD countries, no distinction is made between different fiscal policy regimes. That is, annual 
changes in taxes and spending are simply correlated with annual growth rates of private 
demands. 
In their later study, Giavazzi and Pagano (1995) separate the data into ordinary and 
extraordinary regimes. They conclude that cuts in government spending are more likely to 
stimulate short-term growth when the cuts are strong and persistent. Weaker evidence is reported 
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for non-Keynesian effects of tax increases and reductions in transfers. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) examine data for 19 OECD countries beginning in the 1960s. 
First, they observe that most strong fiscal contractions stem from tax increases. Second, cuts in 
transfers and government wages reduce the public debt-GDP ratio more than do increases in 
taxes or reductions in government investment. Finally, fiscal contractions that put the debt-GDP 
ratio on a downward trend start in periods of high growth, which may explain that result. 
Alesina and Perotti (1997) conclude that fiscal contractions achieved with spending 
reductions endure longer and stimulate growth more than fiscal contractions achieved through 
tax increases. More specifically, they find non-Keynesian effects are more probable if the fiscal 
contraction relies on cuts in transfers and government employee compensation. They stress that 
cuts in government employment may put downward pressure on labor costs, and thus improve 
profits and international competitiveness, and stimulate domestic investment and net exports. 
McDermott and Wescott (1996) report that large fiscal contractions need not produce an 
economic slowdown, especially if they reduce the public debt-GDP ratio. They agree with 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) that composition matters, and that spending cuts are more effective. 
But they also stress that size is important. Finally, they find that the positive response of short-
term growth is related to investment rather than consumption. 
Perotti (1999) examines whether changes in government spending and taxes have 
qualitatively different effects on private consumption with a large or rising public debt-GDP 
ratio. In his model, that can occur because expectations of lower future taxes disproportionately 
increase consumption by those who can finance additional consumption with credit. His 
empirical findings provide some support for such non-Keynesian effects, although most results 
are not statistically significant. His strongest findings are that cuts in government spending 
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stimulate private consumption when the public debt is growing rapidly compared to GDP. 
Finally, Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000) consider the effects of fiscal impulses on 
national saving rather than on private consumption. They estimate a simple saving function for 
OECD countries and developing countries separately. Their discussion focuses on non-linear 
rather than non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy, where non-linear effects do not necessarily 
involve a sign reversal. For OECD countries, they conclude that large fiscal contractions possess 
larger non-linear effects than large fiscal expansions, consistent with the Giavazzi and Pagano 
(1996) results for consumption spending. Symmetry emerges, however, for large fiscal 
expansions and contractions in developing countries. 
By focusing on non-linear effects, Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000) alter the terms 
of the debate surrounding unusual fiscal events. For example, they find that net taxes as a share 
of potential GDP possess a significant positive effect on national saving as a share of potential 
GDP under normal circumstances. If a large fiscal event occurs, the magnitude of this positive 
effect falls, but does not reverse. They never discover a sign reversal in their estimations. And a 
sign reversal must occur to produce non-Keynesian effects. Thus, finding non-linear fiscal events 
occurs more easily than non-Keynesian fiscal events. The authors  carefully distinguish between 
such findings when discussing our results. 
IV. IDENTIFYING FISCAL POLICY REGIMES 
As indicated above, the empirical literature on the non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy 
adjustments varies the definitions of changes in fiscal policy regimes. Some studies consider 
periods no longer than a year; others settle on two-year periods. Also, studies vary by the 
minimum amount of fiscal restraint or stimulus needed to qualify a fiscal adjustment as a regime 
change. Beyond that, studies use different criteria for changes in the public debt-GDP ratio to 
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distinguish successful fiscal adjustments from unsuccessful ones. Such differences may explain 
the variation in reported non-Keynesian effects on short-term growth. 
Although more than one acceptable definition of different fiscal policy regimes exists, it 
is surprising that most studies generally limit the preferred choice to a one- or two-year duration. 
Consequently, fiscal contractions or expansions lasting three years or more are viewed as a 
sequence of separate fiscal contractions or expansions rather than as one long and continuous 
period of fiscal restraint or stimulus. That practice may also affect the reported results.1 
Limiting the length of a fiscal contraction or expansion to two years is especially 
questionable when examining the data for unusual fiscal effects. In large part, those effects 
depend on credible changes in the fiscal policy regime, and credibility may take several years to 
establish. Most studies that give some consideration to fiscal contractions lasting at least three 
years place more stress on the shorter fiscal contractions. The theoretical justifications for that 
are not compelling, and when results are reported for fiscal contractions lasting at least three 
years; they do not support the existence of strong unusual fiscal effects. 
As such, the authors examine persistent fiscal adjustments lasting at least three years. For 
each country, a persistent and large fiscal adjustment is one whose cumulative magnitude 
(adjusted for the mean) exceeds what would be expected by chance by more than one standard 
deviation.2 Most other studies do not use country-specific criteria. Thus, the authors distinguish 
(through the use of slope dummy variables) between large fiscal adjustments lasting at least three 
years and those that are shorter or smaller. The sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of 
those coefficients of the slope dummy variables measure the marginal effects of an unusual fiscal 
event. Those marginal may or may not cause the sign of the overall effects to differ in times of 
unusual fiscal adjustments. 
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The authors then determine the times when trigger points accompany the persistent and 
large fiscal adjustments. The authors measure trigger points with three different variables: (a) the 
public debt-GDP ratio, (b) the public consumption-GDP ratio, and (c) the cyclically adjusted 
(structural) primary deficit divided by potential GDP.3 The first and second have their theoretical 
bases in the work of Sutherland (1997) and Bertola and Drazen (1993).4 The level of the primary 
structural deficit represents the policy-induced change in the debt-GDP ratio. 
For each of those three variables, the authors use two alternative criteria to determine if 
trigger points occur in the year immediately preceding a large and persistent fiscal adjustment. In 
one case, a trigger point exists when the variable in that year exceeds its mean plus one standard 
deviation. In the other case, a trigger point exists when the variable in that year is larger than all 
preceding values -- a step function approach. Applying those two criteria to each of the three 
variables produces six possibilities for trigger points, each of which defines an interactive 
dummy variable. Each of the six trigger dummy variables is included interactively with the slope 
dummy variables for large and persistent fiscal adjustments to distinguish large and persistent 
fiscal contractions and expansions with and without trigger points. Because of the limited 
number of large and persistent fiscal adjustments with trigger points, however, the authors use 
only one of the trigger dummy variables at a time. 
Perotti (1999) incorporates trigger points into his empirical work. He considers both the 
level and the recent change in the public debt, cyclically adjusted and measured relative to 
potential GDP. For the level at the beginning of the fiscal adjustment, he uses two values, 0.8 
and 0.9. He also tries increases in the public debt-GDP ratio of two and thee percent. His results 
suggest that the movement in the debt-GDP ratio is more important than the level itself. 
Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000) also consider the same trigger variables as Perotti (1999). 
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They find no significant effects for OECD countries but significant effects for developing 
countries. 
Our analysis of persistent and large fiscal adjustments identifies 41 unusual fiscal events -- 22 
contractions and 19 expansions. For the level of the public debt, the authors find that only three 
of the 41 unusual fiscal events have a debt-GDP ratio at least one standard deviation above the 
mean at the start of the event, thus qualifying as a trigger point. Based on the step-function 
approach, 19 of 41 potential trigger points based on the debt meet the criterion. 
The authors have more success for the level of the primary structural balance. In that 
case, 17 of 41 potential trigger points possess a primary structural deficit larger than the mean 
plus a standard deviation. Based on the step function, only 10 of 41 cases meet that requirement. 
Finally, the authors also apply the two criteria for determining trigger points using 
government consumption to GDP. Now, 10 of 41 years meet the requirement of one standard 
deviation above the mean. And 19 of 41 cases qualify based on the step-function approach. 
V. SOME PRELIMINARY STATISTICS 
Before presenting our regression analysis, some simple statistics provide some initial 
findings. In this section, the authors only consider fiscal contractions and thus exclude 
expansions. The authors divide the large and persistent fiscal contractions into two groups – 
those with and without recessions – and compare the characteristics of those two groups. 
In most cases, the fiscal contractions associated with recessions do not differ much from 
those that are not. That conclusion draws on our examination of seven characteristics (Table 1).  
A. Length of Fiscal Contraction.  
Longer fiscal contractions may have stronger non-Keynesian effects than shorter ones, if 
they are more credible. On the other hand, longer fiscal contractions are more likely to encounter 
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a recession simply because they cover a longer time period. Which factor is more important 
cannot be determined by theory. 
The average length of the 10 fiscal contractions without recessions was four-and-a-half 
years. But that estimate includes a nine-year fiscal contraction in Japan. Excluding Japan reduces 
the average length to four years. By comparison, the average length of the fiscal contractions 
associated with recessions also was four years. Thus, for large fiscal contractions lasting at least 
three years, little or no difference exists between the average length between those that are 
associated with recessions and those that are not. 
Even though the averages for the two groups are roughly the same, there is some limited 
evidence that the length of a fiscal contraction might matter. In particular, five of the eight fiscal 
contractions (62.5 percent) lasting exactly three years are associated with recessions, while only 
seven of the 14 longer than three years (50 percent) have recessions. In addition, 10 of the 17 
fiscal contractions (59 percent) lasting three or four years are associated with recessions, while 
only one of the four longer than four years (25 percent) have recessions. Those differences 
suggest that the non-Keynesian effects of longer large fiscal contractions may be stronger than 
those of shorter fiscal contractions. But the sample is too small to put much confidence in that 
conclusion. 
B. Size of Fiscal Contraction.  
In theory, large fiscal contractions may have stronger non-Keynesian effects than small 
fiscal contractions, if larger ones signal a change in the policy regime.5 On a cumulative basis, 
the average size of the 10 fiscal contractions without recessions is 6.5 percent of potential GDP, 
compared to 5.3 percent for those with recessions. On a per annum basis, the average amount of 
annual restraint for the 10 cases without recessions is 1.6 percent, compared to 1.3 percent per 
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annum for those with recessions. Those differences are also consistent with the non-Keynesian 
view, but they seem too small to have major macroeconomic consequences. 
Similar conclusions hold when looking at only the dozen or so largest fiscal contractions. 
Recessions are associated with exactly half of the dozen fiscal contractions with a cumulative 
restraint of at least five percent of potential GDP (Table 2, column 2). Moreover, recessions are 
associated with eight of the 13 fiscal contractions having an average annual restraint of more 
than one percent of potential GDP (Table 2, column 3). 
C. Front-Loading.  
The more a fiscal contraction is front-loaded (i.e., fiscal constraint concentrated in the 
early years), the more credible it may be. On average, the amount of front-loading in the first 
year is somewhat more for the fiscal contractions with recessions (27 percent) than for those 
without recessions (18 percent). The fiscal contractions without recessions have 43 percent of 
their total restraint in the first two years, compared to 55 percent for those with recessions. Those 
differences are not consistent with the non-Keynesian view because the fiscal contractions with 
recessions are the ones that have more front loading. 
Similar conclusions hold when the focus is on the fiscal contractions with the most front 
loading. Of those, five of the six that have at least 30 percent of the restraint concentrated in the 
first year are associated with recessions. Moreover, six of the seven fiscal contractions with at 
least 60 percent of the restraint concentrated in the first two years are associated with recessions. 
D. Spending Cuts Versus Tax Hikes.  
Some empirical studies report that fiscal contractions dominated by reductions in 
government spending rather than by increases in taxes more likely possess strong non-Keynesian 
effects. For fiscal contractions without recessions, an average of 60 percent of the restraint stems 
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from expenditure cuts. That is two-thirds higher than for the fiscal contractions with recessions 
(36 percent). Moreover, the averages include three cases when spending is raised, not lowered, 
and all of those three cases are associated with recessions. Finally, recessions do not accompany 
eight of the 13 fiscal contractions that have more than half of the fiscal restraint concentrated in 
spending cuts. Thus, there is some evidence supporting the view that fiscal contractions achieved 
mostly through spending cuts are less likely to be associated with recessions.  
E. Government Consumption.  
Fiscal contractions can possess strong non-Keynesian effects if they occur at times when 
government consumption absorbs so much output that it triggers expectations of a cutback in 
government consumption. The data provide some support for that view. On average, government 
consumption is 20.5 percent of GDP immediately before the fiscal contractions without 
recessions. In the 12 cases with recessions, government consumption is, on average, 17.8 percent 
of GDP at the beginning of the fiscal contractions. In addition, eight of the dozen fiscal 
contractions with the highest ratios of government consumption to GDP are not associated with 
recessions. 
F. Primary Structural Deficit.  
The primary structural deficit is a major determinant of the growth of public debt relative 
to GDP, and may be a better indicator of a trigger point than the debt-GDP ratio itself. The sizes 
of the primary structural deficits at the beginning of fiscal contractions, however, are not 
substantially different between the two groups. For fiscal contractions without recessions, the 
average size is 4.1 percent of potential GDP, compared to 3.5 percent for those with recessions. 
Moreover, half of the dozen fiscal contractions with the largest primary structural deficits 
measured relative to potential GDP are associated with recessions. 
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G. Level of Public Debt Relative to GDP.  
According to the non-Keynesian view, a fiscal contraction will generate strong non-
Keynesian effects if it is undertaken when the debt-GDP ratio is high enough to trigger 
expectations of imminent action on the budget. But, the two groups of fiscal contractions differ 
little in terms of the average debt-GDP ratio at the beginning of the fiscal contraction -- 62.0 
percent for the cases without recessions and 60.8 percent for the cases with recessions. Thus, 
high debt-GDP ratios do not seem to have triggered strong non-Keynesian effects. Moreover, the 
same conclusion holds for the dozen fiscal contractions with the highest government debt-GDP 
ratios at the beginning of the fiscal contractions. Exactly half are accompanied by recessions.  
VI. DATA FOR ANALYSIS 
With one exception, all data come from the OECD. The monetary variables come from 
International Financial Statistics. The tax and spending components of the cyclically-adjustment 
primary deficits (measured relative to potential GDP) are data provided by the OECD. The data 
for GDP and its components for each country are from the OECD National Accounts, Volume I. 
The data for 20 OECD countries end in 1996. For a few countries, the data begin in 1970. 
For most, the data begin in the early or middle 1970s. For New Zealand, however, the data does 
not start until 1986. Consequently, the authors exclude New Zealand from the analysis. 
After excluding New Zealand from our sample, the authors still have an unbalanced 
panel data set of 19.6 It is unbalanced because only some of the countries have data beginning in 
1970, although all end in 1996. The authors use the procedure for unbalanced data sets outlined 
in Greene (1990). Since the authors are estimating our models with pooled cross-section, time-
series data, the authors employ the fixed-effect panel regression technique, allowing for 
differences across countries due to omitted country-specific variables. 
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VII: ESTIMATION 
Our regression analysis examines three different models that capture the effects, if any, of 
fiscal variables on economic activity. The three models are: (1) A fixed-effect panel estimation 
of a St. Louis equation similar to Batten and Hafer (1983); (2) A fixed-effect panel estimation of 
a Martingale model of consumption similar to Hall (1978) and Flavin (1981); and (3) A fixed-
effect panel estimation of a growth accounting relationship similar to Levin and Renault (1992), 
Barro (1991), and Miller and Russek (1997). 
A. St. Louis Equation.  
The St. Louis equation traces its origins to the work of Anderson and Jordan (1968). The 
impetus for their work came from the Ando and Modigliani (1965) and Friedman and Meiselman 
(1965) debate. Friedman and Meiselman were criticized on several fronts, including the points 
that the right-side variables in the regressions are endogenous, opening the possibility of reverse 
causality, and the measure of autonomous government spending is problematic. Anderson and 
Jordan attempt to mitigate some of this criticism by using high-employment fiscal spending and 
taxes to lower the problem of endogeneity, and including lagged values of the right-side 
variables (including the fiscal variables) to decrease potential problems of reverse causality. 
Extending the analysis beyond the U.S., Batten and Hafer (1983) examine the St. Louis 
equation using quarterly data for six` countries -- Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the U.K., 
and the U.S. They perform their tests on a country-by-country basis and do not consider using 
pooled data. Moreover, they make two changes to the standard St. Louis specification. First, they 
are forced to use the measured (unadjusted) versions of the fiscal variables, because consistent 
cyclically adjusted measures are not available at that time. Second, since countries other than the 
U.S. are probably more open to the rest of the world, they add exports as another right-side 
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variable, finding significant effects in each country except Japan and the U. S. 
The OECD now computes and makes available data on high-employment fiscal spending 
and taxes, but only on an annual basis. Prior work on the St. Louis equation generally employs 
quarterly data. As a consequence, the authors use pooled estimation to add degrees of freedom to 
our regression work. Of course, the cost the authors bear is the assumption that the effects of the 
right-side variables are the same across the countries in the sample, or at least that the regression 
results capture the average effects across the countries in the sample. The authors also include 
exports as a potential explanatory variable. That is, the authors estimate the following equation: 
(1)  dlnYt = α0 + ∑ α=2 0i HidlnHt-i + α∑ =2 0i GidlnGt-i + α∑ =2 0i TidlnTt-i  
   + ∑ α=2 0i XidlnXt-i + εdYt ,  
where dlnY, dlnH, dlnG, dlnT, and dlnX are the rates of growth in nominal GDP, base money, 
nominal high-employment spending, nominal high-employment revenue, and nominal exports, 
respectively, ln is the natural logarithm operator, αjis are parameters to be estimated, and εdY is 
the random error. The authors choose to include the current and two lags of each variable, 
allowing the effects to accumulate over three years.7 
B. Consumption Equation.  
Hall (1978) argues that if the permanent income hypothesis is accurate, then consumption 
spending is well approximated by a random-walk model. Hall specifies private consumption 
spending as a random walk and then adds several potential explanatory variables to see if they 
contribute significantly to explaining private consumption spending where the model already 
incorporates the information contained in lagged consumption. For example, Hall considers 
lagged income and the stock market index as possible additional explanatory variables. Flavin 
(1981) and Campbell and Mankiw (1989) carry out important related work. 
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The authors adopt a version of the Hall (1978) approach in our cross-country evaluation 
of the role of fiscal policy variables in economic activity. In addition to including lagged real 
consumption spending in an equation to explain real consumption spending, the authors also 
include the lagged values of real export spending, real high-employment government spending, 
and real high-employment tax revenue. Our basic specification is as follows: 
(2)  Ct = β0 + β1Ct-1 + β2Xt-1 + β3Gt-1 + β4Tt-1 + εCt , 
where C, X, G, and T are real per capita values of consumption, exports, high-employment 
government spending, and high-employment government revenue, respectively, βis are 
parameters to be estimated, and εC is the random error. 
C. Growth Accounting Equation.  
By contrast with our other empirical analysis, this section tests for the conclusions set 
forth by Bertola and Drazen (1993). More specifically, it examines whether the standard findings 
from the growth accounting literature are reversed by unusual fiscal events. The empirical work 
on the determinants of economic growth has experienced an explosion of activity. The 
publication of comparable cross-country data (e.g., Summers and Heston (1991) and World Bank 
Tables) has facilitated a growth industry in the estimation of cross-country growth equations. 
Our data come almost entirely from the OECD, which has recently reported comparable cross-
country data on high-employment government spending and revenue. 
The original empirical work on the determinants of growth (e.g., Kormendi and Meguire, 
1985; Barro, 1991; Levin and Renelt, 1992) use average data for each country to generate a cross 
section of observations. That is, each country provides one data point to the regression analysis. 
Some researchers introduce a time dimension to their analysis (e.g., Grier and Tullock, 1989; 
Islam, 1995; Miller and Russek, 1997) either by breaking the sample into sub-periods of time 
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over which the data are averaged or by considering each time period as a separate observation in 
a pooled regression. 
The initial papers average data over time to try to eliminate short-run cyclical activity 
and to isolate the long-run trend relationships. We, by contrast, determine the effects, if any, of 
unusual fiscal events on short-run economic activity. Thus, the authors employ our pooled cross-
section, time-series data set without averaging across any sub-period. That is, the authors 
examine the effects of various variables on real per capita GDP growth, where each year 
represents another observation. That approach enables us to examine the effects, if any, of fiscal 
policy on short-run economic activity. 
Levin and Renelt (1992) provide sensitivity analysis of the determinants of growth that 
are proposed and estimated in the literature. They identify variables as robust and fragile, finding 
that most variables fall into the fragile category. Among the robust variables are the investment 
to GDP ratio, the growth rate of population, and lagged real GDP. The authors include those 
three variables in the growth accounting regressions along with the measures of fiscal actions -- 
high-employment spending and revenue divided by high-employment GDP. In addition, the 
authors include the growth rate of base money as an explanatory variable. Although Levin and 
Renelt (1992) identify this variable as fragile, the literature continues to employ a money growth 
variable in growth regressions. Consequently, our basic specification is as follows: 
(3)  dlnyt = γ0 + γ1lnyt-1 + γ2invt + γ3dlnpopt + γ4gt + γ5tt + γ6dlnHt + εdyt , 
where dlny, dlnpop, and dlnH are the rates of growth of real per capita GDP, population, and 
base money, respectively, lny is the logarithm of real per capita GDP, inv is the investment to 
GDP ratio, g and t are high-employment spending and revenue relative to high-employment 
GDP, γis are the parameters to be estimated, and εdy is the random error. 
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D. Testing for Different Fiscal Regimes.  
As noted above, the authors identify unusual fiscal expansions and contractions based on 
the change in the cyclically adjusted primary fiscal balance, either an increase or a decrease 
lasting at least three years. Unusual fiscal expansions or contractions are those that exceed the 
mean by one-standard deviation measured over the period of duration. That is, the authors 
cumulate uninterrupted large positive or negative changes in the cyclically-adjusted primary 
fiscal balance and test whether those changes over a three-year or longer period exceed one-
standard deviation from a normal movement adjusted for the mean. the authors identify, as noted 
previously, 41 such events in the 19 countries over the 27-year period -- 22 contractions and 19 
expansions. Table 2 reports the unusual fiscal contractions and expansions. 
To test for significant differences in the effects of those unusual fiscal events, the authors 
construct interactive dummy variables for unusual fiscal contractions (DC) and unusual fiscal 
expansions (DE). The estimated coefficients for those dummy variables measure the marginal 
effects of unusual fiscal events relative to normal fiscal events. Whenever the authors consider 
one of our models (i.e., equations 1, 2, and 3), the authors estimate two models. The first does 
not include any dummy variables, and this does not distinguish between usual and unusual fiscal 
events. The second includes the dummy variable for unusual fiscal contractions (DC) and the 
dummy variable for unusual fiscal expansions (DE), each interacted with the fiscal variables. The 
authors perform F-tests to see if unusual fiscal contractions possess different effects from 
unusual fiscal expansions. In each case, the authors reject the null hypothesis that the unusual 
fiscal expansions and contractions have the same effect. 
As a second step, the authors identify trigger points beyond which unusual fiscal events 
may have significantly different effects. That is, it may not be sufficient to identify unusual fiscal 
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events. An unusual fiscal event may only begin to have a significantly different effect from a 
normal fiscal event, if some other fiscal variable has achieved some critical level. For example, 
an unusual fiscal contraction may only have a significantly different effect if the debt-GDP ratio 
exceeds some unusual value. This idea builds on the recent work of Perotti (1999), who performs 
similar tests.  
The authors consider six different possible trigger points over three different variables -- 
the public sector debt-GDP ratio, the primary structural deficit-potential GDP ratio, and the 
government consumption-GDP ratio. The authors apply two different methods to identify trigger 
points for each of those three variables. A trigger point is identified if the value of the variable 
exceeds by one standard deviation the normal mean of the variable in the year preceding the 
unusual fiscal policy change or if the variable reaches a new peak relative to its history in that 
year.  
Having identified these six possible trigger points, the authors then interact them with the 
slope dummy variables for the unusual fiscal expansions and contractions. When the authors 
include the interaction dummy variables (i.e., an unusual fiscal event multiplied by one of the 
trigger dummy variables), the authors also include the original unusual fiscal event dummy 
variable. As a consequence, fiscal policy can possess three levels of effects – an effect during 
normal times, an effect during unusual fiscal events, and an effect during an unusual fiscal event 
preceded by a triggering event. During unusual fiscal adjustments, the total effect is either the 
sum of the first two coefficients for an unusual fiscal event or the sum of all three coefficients for 
an unusual fiscal event preceded by a triggering event. For fiscal expansions, the authors have 
empty sets for all but two of the six triggers -- a trigger based on achieving a new peak in the 
public sector debt or in government consumption relative to GDP. By contrast, all six trigger 
 21
dummy variables associate with some unusual fiscal contractions. Table 2 reports information 
about the six different trigger variables. 
In sum, the authors provide a comprehensive examination of unusual fiscal contractions 
and expansions combined with a series of possible triggering variables. The authors find some 
robust and consistent evidence that the outcomes of unusual fiscal events – either contractions or 
expansions -- differ significantly from normal fiscal events. But that evidence is not 
overwhelming or pervasive. Thus, our findings do not provide much support for the view that 
systematic non-Keynesian fiscal policy effects within a Keynesian model and/or non-classical 
effects within a classical model exist and dominate. 
VIII. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. St. Louis Equation.  
Tables 3 and 4 report the results for the estimation of the St. Louis equation. Column one 
of Table 3 shows the standard St. Louis equation without any dummy variables. These results 
correspond generally with the standard findings for St. Louis equation estimations. To wit, the 
high-employment fiscal spending and revenue variables do not possess a long-lasting significant 
effect on the growth of nominal GDP. Both base money growth and export growth have enduring 
significant positive effects on nominal GDP growth.  
Focusing on the fiscal variables, the growth of high-employment revenue has a 
significant positive contemporaneous effect on nominal GDP growth, a finding counter to the 
traditional Keynesian view of the world. This finding may merely reflect reverse causality, 
however. That is, the secular growth in nominal GDP causes the growth in nominal high-
employment revenue on a contemporaneous basis, because the cyclical growth in revenue could 
be underestimated. At the same time, it is consistent with the non-Keynesian view that increasing 
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taxes today can stimulate aggregate spending by reducing expected future tax rates. The growth 
of high-employment fiscal spending has a positive effect with a lag of one year at the 10-percent 
level of significance. Otherwise, it is not significant. 
The inclusion of the fiscal dummy variables in column two of Table 3 produces some 
evidence of differences in the effects of normal and unusual fiscal events. Most of the action 
appears with the unusual fiscal expansions. There are significant positive coefficients on the 
growth rate of high-employment government spending during normal times at one- and two-year 
lags at the one- and 10-percent levels, respectively. But note that the overall outcomes undergo a 
sign reversal from normal times to unusual fiscal expansions. Those outcomes are measured by 
the sum of the coefficients for normal times, and the coefficient for unusual episodes. Now the 
unusual fiscal expansion possesses negative outcomes that are significant at the five- and 10-
percent levels for the current and one-year lagged effects.8 Those marginal negative effects 
measured by the interactive fiscal dummy variables are consistent with a non-Keynesian view, 
and dominate the overall effect. That is, during unusual fiscal expansions, increased high-
employment spending associates with lower nominal GDP growth. Moreover, those findings do 
not depend on any of the trigger dummy variables (see Table 4). 
In addition, the authors find a positive and significant effect of the growth of high-
employment government revenue on nominal GDP growth during unusual fiscal expansions with 
a one-year lag at the one-percent level, with a two-year lag at the 10-percent level, and 
contemporaneously at the 20-percent level. The contemporaneous effect reinforces the non-
Keynesian finding for high-employment government revenue during normal times. But the one- 
and two-year lagged effects reverse the insignificant negative (Keynesian) effects under normal 
times at the five- and 10-percent levels, respectively.9 Those outcomes for the lag coefficients 
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probably reflect non-Keynesian effects rather than the reverse causality channel mentioned 
above. But they could reflect reverse causality because GDP is autocorrelated. In any event, 
those results do not depend on any of the trigger dummy variables (see Table 4). 
Only one coefficient achieves statistical significance when considering unusual fiscal 
contractions as opposed to expansions. In this case, increases in high-employment government 
spending stimulate nominal GDP growth on a contemporaneous basis. But that effect significant 
only at the 10-percent level. 
Turning to Table 4 where the authors introduce the trigger dummy variables, the authors 
see a few instances when an unusual fiscal event has a significant effect while its interaction with 
a trigger dummy variable has a significant effect of the opposite sign. But, no consistent pattern 
emerges. In only one instance does the sign completely reverse and become significant – the 
contemporaneous growth of high-employment government spending with the new peak of the 
public-sector debt to GDP trigger. In that instance, however, the significant positive effect 
captures a standard Keynesian effect. 
B. Consumption Equation.  
Tables 5 and 6 present the findings for the martingale consumption equation. Column one 
of Table 5 reports the results of regressing real consumption per capita onto its once-lagged 
value, real exports per capita lagged one year, and real high-employment government spending 
and revenue per capita lagged one year. Each variable is significant at the one-percent level. 
Observe that the coefficient of lagged real per capita consumption spending does not differ 
significantly from one at even the 10-percent level, which is consistent with the view that real 
per capita consumption spending follows a random walk. Nevertheless, the remaining three 
variables are also significant. That is, higher real exports per capita, higher real high-
 24
employment government spending per capita, and lower real high-employment government 
revenue per capita all associate with higher real per capita consumption spending after 
controlling for lagged real per capita private consumption spending. Those coefficients for the 
fiscal variables do not support the non-Keynesian view. 
Distinguishing unusual fiscal expansions and contractions from other periods does not 
alter the results much. The coefficients of real high-employment government spending and 
revenue per capita during the unusual fiscal expansions and contractions are only significant at 
the 10- and 20-percent levels. Although the signs change in the case of unusual fiscal 
expansions, those sign reversals only partly offset, and do not reverse, the positive effect of real 
government spending per capita in normal times and the negative effect of real government 
revenue per capita in normal times. So the marginal effects of unusual fiscal expansions might be 
called non-Keynesian, but they are not large enough to produce non-Keynesian outcomes on 
aggregate consumption. They only reduce the magnitude of the Keynesian effects in normal 
times, although neither outcome is significant at the 10-percent level.10 Finally, there are not 
even partial offsets in the case of unusual fiscal contractions. 
Table 6 presents the results of introducing the various trigger points. The strongest 
findings emerge when the primary structural deficit or government consumption triggers are 
used. First, regardless of whether it is the variance or the threshold of the primary structural 
deficit, the coefficients of high-employment real government spending and revenue per capita 
strengthen their normal effects during unusual fiscal contractions and then reverse signs when 
the unusual fiscal contraction associates with the trigger dummy variable. High-employment real 
government spending now has a negative effect while high-employment real government 
revenue has a positive effect.11 That is, those results reverse the Keynesian effects observed 
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under normal conditions. Although the signs reverse, the effects are not significantly different 
from zero (except at the 20-percent level for high-employment real government spending per 
capita during a fiscal contraction with a trigger based on the variance of the primary structural 
deficit). Second, when the authors use the government consumption to GDP trigger dummy 
variables, the signs reverse on the coefficients of fiscal contractions from normal times to 
unusual times, and then reverse again from unusual times to unusual times with a trigger.12 In 
other words, the Keynesian effects in normal times are reversed during unusual times, becoming 
non-Keynesian, and then re-reversed when the unusual fiscal contraction associates with the 
government consumption trigger dummy variables becoming Keynesian once again. 
In sum, the consumption equations provide some evidence for non-Keynesian effects 
during episodes of unusual fiscal contractions. Those findings, however, do not tell a consistent 
story. In one instance the non-Keynesian effect occurs when an unusual fiscal expansion 
associates with the primary structural deficit trigger dummy variables, while in another instance, 
the non-Keynesian effect occurs for unusual fiscal contractions not associated with the 
government consumption trigger dummy variables. 
C. Growth Accounting Equation.  
Tables 7 and 8 provide the findings for the growth accounting regressions. As noted 
above, these results test an expanded version of the conclusions of Bertola and Drazen (1993), 
where the growth of output replaces the growth of private consumption. Column one of Table 7 
reports the results without dummy variables for unusual fiscal expansions and contractions. The 
coefficient of lagged real GDP per capita is negative and significant at the one-percent level. 
This effect matches the findings in the literature on the international growth convergence 
hypothesis. That is, low real per capita GDP countries grow faster, on average, than high real per 
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capita GDP countries. The investment to GDP ratio has the expected positive sign, but is 
significant only at the 20-percent level. The rate of growth of base money has a significant 
positive effect on real per capita GDP growth, a result that is inconsistent with a number of 
studies in the literature (e.g., Fischer, 1993; Miller and Russek, 1997). The rate of population 
growth has an expected significantly negative effect on real per capita GDP growth (Levine and 
Renelt 1992). 
High-employment government spending (as a share of potential GDP) has a significant 
negative effect on real per capita GDP growth while high-employment government revenue to 
GDP has a positive, but insignificant, effect. The negative effect of government spending 
matches the standard neo-classical result in the literature (e.g., Barro, 1991; Landau, 1983; 
Miller and Russek, 1997). The negative sign may signal that the large government share of the 
economy retards economic growth. Alternatively, reverse causality may exist, indicating that 
slowing economic growth may call for expansionary fiscal policy through spending increases. 
The introduction of dummy variables for unusual fiscal expansions and contractions does 
not reveal reversals of neo-classical outcomes. As in the base case, high-employment 
government spending has a significant negative effect on the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
in normal times. Now, however, high-employment government revenue has a significant positive 
effect during normal times, but only at the 10-percent level. The coefficient on government 
revenue during unusual fiscal contractions reverses the sign of the effect in normal times, but the 
overall outcome is not significant.13 Those finding continue to hold once the authors introduce 
the trigger dummy variables (see Table 8). 
Table 8 reports the results of interactively including the six fiscal trigger dummy 
variables. Nearly all findings remain unchanged with one exception. The effect of high-
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employment government spending reverses sign when the authors use the trigger based on the 
variance of the public-sector debt. But that reversal is significant only at the 20-percent level.14 
IX. CONCLUSION 
While the authors find limited evidence of reversal outcomes for unusually large fiscal 
contractions and expansions from time-to-time and under special conditions, the authors find no 
robust, consistent evidence. The authors do find a few more cases of outcome reversals when the 
authors take into account trigger points that attempt to measure times of extreme fiscal stress. 
The authors find weak evidence of non-Keynesian outcomes in our analysis of the St. 
Louis equation, as measured by the sum of the coefficient in normal times and the coefficient in 
unusual times. That evidence emerges for unusual fiscal expansions, but not for unusual fiscal 
contractions. With an unusual fiscal expansion, the effect of nominal growth in high-
employment government spending becomes negative while the effect of nominal growth in high-
employment government revenue becomes positive, and the sign reversals on the sum of the 
coefficients are significant at the five- and 10-percent levels, respectively.15 Those findings do 
not rely on the inclusion of fiscal trigger points. 
The strongest evidence for non-Keynesian effects emerges in our estimation of the 
consumption equation, but only for the equation estimated with trigger points based on the 
primary structural fiscal deficit and government consumption. Without trigger points, unusual 
fiscal contractions simply magnify the conventional positive and negative effects of real per 
capita government spending and revenue on real per capita real private consumption spending. 
When the authors interact unusual fiscal contractions with the primary structural deficit or the 
government consumption triggers, then the authors generate the sign reversals characteristic of 
the non-Keynesian literature. For the primary structural deficit triggers, the sign reversal occurs 
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only for the unusual fiscal contraction associated with those trigger dummy variables. The 
unusual fiscal contraction by itself strengthens the standard Keynesian outcome. Conversely, for 
the government consumption triggers, the sign reversal occurs for the unusual fiscal contraction 
by itself, while the unusual fiscal contraction associated with the trigger dummy variables 
produces once again the standard Keynesian outcome. 
Almost no evidence of Keynesian effects emerges when the authors consider the growth 
accounting equation. The baseline model exhibits neo-classical effects, and the introduction of 
unusual fiscal expansion or contraction variables with or without trigger dummies produces few 
significant changes. The one exception is a marginally significant sign reversal for the effect of 
high-employment government spending during an unusual fiscal contraction with a trigger point 
based on the variance of public-sector debt.  
In sum, with few exceptions our analysis provides little systematic evidence of unusual 
fiscal outcomes for the 19 OECD countries in our sample from 1970 to 1996. Our analysis, 
however, considers only whether unusual fiscal outcomes exist across all countries in our 
sample. Previous research suggests that unusual fiscal outcomes may emerge on a significant 
scale in particular countries and in particular time periods. Our findings cast some doubt on the 
possibility that unusual fiscal outcomes are a result of some systematic relationships in the macro 
economy. Rather, special circumstances and conditions may dictate when and where unusual 
fiscal outcomes emerge. The authors do not rule out the possibility of systematic unusual fiscal 
outcomes. But our findings raise serious doubts. 
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1. Heylen and Everaert (2000) also make this criticism. 
2. To be precise, the cumulative magnitude (adjusted for the mean) exceeds the square 
root of the length of the fiscal adjustment times the standard deviation of the annual change in 
the cyclically adjusted (structural) primary deficit divided by potential GDP. Miller (1986, 1989) 
employed that statistic in his study of short-run money demand shifts. Afonso (2001) uses a 
similar procedure, but for only one or two years. 
3. The primary deficit equals the total deficit less interest payments. 
4. Unlike Sutherland (1997) who models the economy to have non-Keynesian effects in 
unusual times, Bertola and Drazen (1993) model the economy to have neo-classical results in 
normal times and Keynesian effects in unusual times. 
5. A larger fiscal contraction in one country compared to another, however, may not 
produce a larger reduction in the public debt-GDP ratio of that country. That is because the level 
of interest rates and the rate of economic growth are also important factors determining what 
happens to that debt-GDP ratio. 
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6. The countries in our data set with sample periods in parentheses include the following: 
Australia (1973-96), Austria (1974-96), Belgium (1974-96), Canada (1973-96), Denmark (1971-
96), Finland (1973-96), France (1972-96), Germany (1970-96), Greece (1975-96), Ireland (1971-
96), Italy (1972-96), Japan (1972-96), the Netherlands (1974-96), Norway (1975-96), Portugal 
(1970-96), Spain (1970-96), Sweden (1970-96), the U.K. (1970-96), and the U.S. (1970-96). The 
series for Germany possesses a structural break in 1991 after unification. The authors incorporate 
a dummy variable to capture this break in the series, but the dummy variable is never significant. 
Thus, The authors report results without that structural break. 
7. The authors experiment with lag lengths, examining no, one, two, and three lags. The 
best performing specification includes two lags. 
8. Specifically, the coefficients on government spending in normal times at lags zero 
(0.0257) and one (0.0975) plus the coefficients on government spending in unusual fiscal 
expansions at lags zero (-0.2643) and one (-0.3104) produce the overall outcomes at lags zero (-
0.2386) and one (-0.2129). Those overall outcomes are significant at the five- and 10-percent 
levels with the following test statistics: F(1,387) = 4.36 and F(1, 387) = 2.89. 
9..Here, the overall outcomes for lags one (0.2982 = -0.0177 + 0.3159) and two (0.1983 = 
-0.0066 + 0.2049) record the following test statistics: F(1, 387) = 5.78 and F(1. 387) = 3.13. 
10. More precisely, the overall effects of government spending (0.1791 = 0.5414 – 
0.3623) and government revenue (-0.2962 = -0.6103 + 0.3141) in unusual expansions are not 
significant [F(1, 441) = 0.54] and significant at only the 20-percent level [F(1, 441) = 1.75]. 
11. For the overall outcomes of government spending with the variance of the primary 
structural deficit (-0.3776 = 0.5672 + 0.5783 – 1.5231) and its threshold (-0.5384 = 0.5607 + 
0.4837 – 1.5828) triggers, the test statistics are F(1, 439) = 2.03 (significant at 20-percent level) 
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and F(1, 439) = 1.24. For the overall outcomes of government revenue with the variance of the 
primary structural deficit (0.1317 = - 0.6325 – 0.4687 + 1.2329) and its threshold (0.1969 = - 
0.6270 – 0.4004 + 1.2243) triggers, the test statistics are F(1, 439) = 0.46 and F(1, 439) = 0.60. 
12. For the overall outcomes of government spending under normal and unusual times, 
but excluding unusual times associated the trigger dummy variables for the variance of 
government consumption (-0.4995 = 0.5598 – 1.0593) and its threshold (-0.9030 = 0.5614 – 
1.4644), the test statistics are F(1, 437) = 2.51 (significant at the 20-percent level) and F(1, 437) 
= 1.08. For the same overall outcomes of government revenue with the variance of government 
consumption (0.2646 = - 0.6264 + 0.8910) and its threshold (0.4443 = - 0.6274 + 1.0717) 
triggers, the test statistics are F(1, 439) = 1.18 and F(1, 437) = 1.13. For the overall outcomes of 
government spending under normal and unusual times, and unusual times with the trigger 
dummy variables for the variance of government consumption (1.0016 = 0.5598 - 1.0593 + 
1.5011) and its threshold (0.9406 = 0.5614 – 1.4644 + 1.8436) triggers, the test statistics are F(1, 
439) = 45.83 and F(1, 437) = 43.62 (both significant at the one-percent level). For the same 
overall outcomes of government revenue with the variance of government consumption (0.9941 
= - 0.6264 + 0.8910 - 1.2587) and its threshold (-0.9489 = - 0.6274 + 1.0717 - 1.3932) triggers, 
the test statistics are F(1, 439) = 81.63 and F(1, 437) = 79.97 (both significant at the one-percent 
level). 
13. The overall outcome’s (-0.0007 = 0.0011 – 0.0017) test statistic is F(1, 470) = 0.08. 
14. Here, the test statistic for the overall outcome (0.0035 = -0.0018 – 0.0011 + 0.0064) 
is F(1, 468) = 1.99. 
15. As The authors noted in the text, however, that result suggests the failure of standard 
Keynesian pump priming, when the pump priming becomes too large (i.e., unusual). 
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TABLE 1 
Characteristics of Fiscal Contractions With and Without Recession 
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          
         Average Proportion Proportion Proportions Initial Initial Debt/GDP
 Period of Cumulative Restraint of Restraint of Restraint due to Government Structural rate at 
 Restraint Restraint per year in year 1 in yrs. 1 & 2 spending cuts Consumption Surplus beginning 
 
 
Fiscal Consolidation Without Recession 
 
United States                  '93 - '96 2.9 0.7 0.21 0.52 0.52 17.3 -1.9 61.8
Japan '79 - '87                7.9 0.9 0.03 0.15 0.03 9.6 -4.9 39.6
France                  '83 - '87 3.3 0.7 0.24 0.58 0.09 19.3 -1.8 34.2
United Kingdom                  '94 - '96 2.7 0.9 0.19 0.70 0.89 21.9 -3.9 56.6
Canada '94 - '96                 5.0 1.7 0.22 0.56 0.78 22.0 -0.3 94.4
Australia                  '85 - '88 3.7 0.9 0.03 0.14 0.73 18.3 -1.0 n.a.
Belgium                  '82 - '87 9.6 1.6 0.35 0.42 0.68 18.6 -6.3 91.3
Denmark                  '83 - '86 12.5 3.1 0.26 0.56 0.62 28.2 -5.3 67.0
Norway '93 - '96                7.2 1.8 0.06 0.32 0.89 22.1 -6.9 36.5
Sweden                  '94 - '96 9.9 3.3 0.16 0.35 0.74 28.1 -8.2 76.3
Average                  4.5 yrs. 6.5 1.6 0.18 0.43 0.60 20.5 -4.1 62.0
 
 
Fiscal Consolidation With Recession 
 
United States                  '76 - '79 2.3 0.6 0.52 0.74 1.34 18.2 -2.0 39.9
Germany '80 - '85                 5.4 0.9 0.15 0.28 0.58 19.7 -3.4 29.3
Italy '91 - '93                 4.9 1.6 0.39 0.84 -0.24 17.6 -3.4 104.5
United Kingdom                 ''79 - '82 5.6 1.4 0.14 0.27 -0.38 20.3 -2.8 57.7 
Canada '79 - 81                 3.2 1.1 0.34 0.44 0.19 19.7 -2.5 46.3
Australia                  '80 - '82 3.0 1.0 0.30 0.63 0.04 17.6 -2.0 n.a.
Greece '90 - '96                 12.3 1.8 0.13 0.41 0.24 15.2 -7.6 66.6
Ireland                 '81 - '84 5.9 1.5 0.03 0.18 0.17 19.9 -8.0 72.8
Ireland                  '86 - '89 7.6 1.9 0.24 0.46 1.33 17.8 -3.5 104.8
Netherlands                 '81 - '83 2.5 0.8 0.24 0.64 0.72 17.4 -2.4 46.9 
Portugal '84 - '86                 8.1 2.7 0.78 0.88 0.90 14.0 -4.6 49.4
Spain '91 - '94                 3.1 0.8 0.03 0.84 -0.58 15.6 -3.1 50.4
Average                  4.0 yrs. 5.3 1.3 0.27 0.55 0.36 17.8 -3.8 60.8
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Congressional Budget Office calculations based on data from the OECD’s Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles. 
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TABLE 2 
Unusual Fiscal Contractions, Expansions, and Trigger Variables 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Trigger Points Measured By: 
       ______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Unusual Fiscal
Contractions 
  Unusual Fiscal
Expansions 
 Std. Dev. 
of the
Public-
Sector 
Debt 
 
New Peak of the 
Public-Sector Debt 
Std. Dev. of 
the Primary 
Structural 
Deficit 
New Peak 
of the
Primary 
Structural 
Deficit 
 
Std. Dev. of 
Government 
Consumption 
New Peak of 
Government 
Consumption 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Australia 80-82; 85-88 89-94   -- 80-82; 85-88; 89-94 80-82   --   -- 85-88 
Austria           --           --   --           --        --   --   --           -- 
Belgium 82-87           --   -- 82-87 82-87 82-87 82-87 82-87 
Canada 79-81; 94-96 82-85 94-96 94-96 79-81 79-81 94-96           -- 
Denmark 83-86 74-77; 79-82; 87-94   -- 83-86 83-86 83-86 83-86 74-77; 83-86 
Finland           -- 77-80; 90-92   --           --        --   --   -- 77-80 
France 83-87 73-75   -- 83-87 83-87   --   -- 83-87 
Germany 80-85           --   -- 80-85 80-85   --   --           -- 
Greece 90-96           --   -- 90-96 90-96 90-96 90-96 90-96 
Ireland 81-84; 86-89           --   -- 81-84; 86-89 81-84 81-84 81-84 81-84 
Italy 91-93           --   -- 91-93        --   -- 91-93 91-93 
Japan 79-87 75-78; 90-96   -- 75-78; 79-87 79-87 79-87   -- 75-78 
Netherlands 81-83 78-80   --           -- 81-83 81-83 81-83 78-80 
Norway 93-96 76-82; 87-92   --           -- 93-96 93-96 93-96 87-92; 93-96 
Portugal 84-86           --   -- 84-86 84-86   -- 84-86 84-86 
Spain 91-94 80-82; 88-90   -- 80-82 91-94   --   -- 80-82; 88-90; 91-94 
Sweden 94-96 72-74; 77-80; 90-93 94-96 72-74; 94-96 94-96 94-96   -- 72-74; 77-80 
United Kingdom 79-82; 94-96           --   --           -- 79-82   --   --           -- 
United States 76-79; 93-96 90-92 93-96 93-96 76-79; 93-
96 
76-79 76-79           -- 
         
Number of Events           22           19   3           19        17   10   10           19 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
NOTE: Columns two and three report the time periods for the unusual fiscal contractions and expansions, respectively, while the last six columns report the 
time periods when the trigger variables are operative. The trigger dummy variables for the standard deviations of the public sector debt, the primary 
structural deficit, and government consumption as well as for the new peak of the primary structural deficit do not have any corresponding unusual 
fiscal expansions, only the trigger dummy variables for the new peaks of the public-sector debt and government consumption do. This explains the lack 
of coefficient estimates in Tables 5 and 7. See the text. 
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TABLE 3 
Estimates of St. Louis Equation 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable No Dummies Fiscal Contraction (DC) and 
Expansion (DE) Dummies 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
dlnHt 0.0336* 
(3.10) 
0.0354* 
(3.33) 
dlnHt-1 0.0573* 
(5.03) 
0.0597* 
(5.33) 
dlnHt-2 0.0368* 
(3.20) 
0.0391* 
(3.46) 
dlnGt 0.0153 
(0.57) 
0.0257 
(0.84) 
dlnGt-1 0.0531‡ 
(1.86) 
0.0975* 
(2.86) 
dlnGt-2 0.0199 
(0.72) 
0.0597‡ 
(1.90) 
DC*dlnGt   -- 0.1412‡ 
(1.68) 
DC*dlnGt-1   -- -0.0511 
(-0.54) 
DC*dlnGt-2   -- -0.0681 
(-0.75) 
DE*dlnGt   -- -0.2643** 
(-2.24) 
DE*dlnGt-1   --  -0.3104** 
(-2.45) 
DE*dlnGt-2   -- -0.1074 
(-0.96) 
dlnTt 0.1513* 
(4.21) 
0.0925** 
(2.15) 
dlnTt-1 0.0115 
(0.33) 
-0.0177 
(-0.44) 
dlnTt-2 0.0275 
(0.85) 
-0.0066 
(-0.18) 
DC*dlnTt   -- 0.0133 
(0.15) 
DC*dlnTt-1   -- 0.0356 
(0.35) 
DC*dlnTt-2   -- 0.0537 
(0.57) 
DE*dlnTt   -- 0.1759‡‡ 
(1.43) 
DE*dlnTt-1   -- 0.3159* 
(2.41) 
DE*dlnTt-2   -- 0.2049‡ 
(1.75) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 3 
Estimates of St. Louis Equation (continued) 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable No Dummies Fiscal Contraction (DC) and 
Expansion (DE) Dummies  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
dlnXt 0.1694* 
(8.49) 
0.1584* 
(7.97) 
dlnXt-1 0.0572* 
(3.03) 
0.0656* 
(3.46) 
dlnXt-2 0.0870* 
(4.76) 
0.0922* 
(5.06) 
R2 0.5542 0.5837 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: The dependent variable is the rate of growth of nominal GDP. The variables dlnH, dlnG, dlnT, and dlnX 
are the rates of growth of base money, nominal high-employment spending, nominal high-employment 
revenue, and nominal exports while DC and DE are the unusual fiscal contraction and expansion dummy 
variables. R2 is the adjusted coefficient of determination. 
 
* means the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the one-percent level 
** means the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the five-percent level 
‡ means the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10-percent level 
‡‡ means the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 20-percent level 
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TABLE 4 
Estimates of St. Louis Equation, Including Trigger Points for Unusual Fiscal Events 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Trigger Dummy Variables (τi) Based on: 
        _________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Fiscal 
Con-
traction 
(DC) and 
Expansion 
(DE) 
Dummies 
Std. Dev. 
of the 
Public-
Sector 
Debt  
New Peak 
of the 
Public-
Sector 
Debt  
Std. Dev. 
of the 
Primary 
Structural 
Deficit  
New Peak 
of the 
Primary 
Structural 
Deficit  
Std. Dev. 
Of 
Govern-
ment Con-
sumption 
New Peak 
of 
Govern-
ment Con-
sumption  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
dlnHt 0.0353* 
(3.33) 
0.0337* 
(3.13) 
0.0364* 
(3.38) 
0.0338* 
(3.18) 
0.0363* 
(3.47) 
0.0335* 
(3.12) 
0.0302* 
(2.79) 
dlnHt-1 0.0597* 
(5.33) 
0.0595* 
(5.25) 
0.0605* 
(5.33) 
0.0583* 
(5.21) 
0.0602* 
(5.33) 
0.0589* 
(5.22) 
0.0517* 
(4.61) 
dlnHt-2 0.0391* 
(3.46) 
0.0409* 
(3.58) 
0.0411* 
(3.58) 
0.0375* 
(3.31) 
0.0395* 
(3.43) 
0.0383* 
(3.37) 
0.0334* 
(2.96) 
dlnGt 0.0257 
(0.84) 
0.0258 
(0.84) 
0.0232 
(0.75) 
0.0287 
(0.94) 
0.0245 
(0.80) 
0.0264 
(0.86) 
0.0331 
(1.09) 
dlnGt-1 0.0975* 
(2.86) 
0.0978* 
(2.86) 
0.0946* 
(2.75) 
0.1021* 
(3.00) 
0.0973* 
(2.86) 
0.0956* 
(2.79) 
0.1048* 
(3.10) 
dlnGt-2 0.0597‡ 
(1.90) 
0.0600‡ 
(1.91) 
0.0553‡ 
(1.75) 
0.0619** 
(1.98) 
0.0592‡ 
(1.88) 
0.0566‡ 
(1.79) 
0.0639** 
(2.05) 
DC*dlnGt 0.1412‡ 
(1.68) 
0.0993 
(1.11) 
-0.1530 
(-0.69) 
0.2412 
(0.91) 
0.1753‡‡ 
(1.59) 
0.1378 
(0.96) 
0.2897‡ 
(1.83) 
DC*dlnGt-1 -0.0511 
(-0.54) 
-0.0623 
(-0.64) 
0.3119‡‡ 
(1.31) 
-0.5241‡‡ 
(-1.39) 
-0.1479 
(-1.19) 
-0.0388 
(-0.22) 
-0.0695 
(-0.33) 
DC*dlnGt-2 -0.0681 
(-0.75) 
-0.0620 
(-0.67) 
-0.0803 
(-0.30) 
-0.2248 
(-0.59) 
-0.0889 
(-0.77) 
0.1021 
(0.62) 
-0.0386 
(-0.21) 
τi*DC*dlnGt   -- -0.3431 
(-0.52) 
0.3299‡‡ 
(1.40) 
-0.0872 
(-0.31) 
-0.08918 
(-0.51) 
-0.0055 
(-0.03) 
-0.2264 
(-1.25) 
τi*DC*dlnGt-1   -- -0.9739 
(-0.51) 
-0.3987‡‡ 
(-1.56) 
0.4681 
(1.21) 
0.1715 
(0.93) 
-0.0195 
(-0.10) 
0.0036 
(0.02) 
τi*DC*dlnGt-2   -- 0.0538 
(0.03) 
-0.0010 
(0.03) 
0.0876 
(0.22) 
0.0736 
(0.42) 
-0.2744‡‡ 
(-1.44) 
-0.0773 
(-0.37) 
DE*dlnGt -0.2643** 
(-2.24) 
-0.2635** 
(-2.22) 
-0.1357 
(-0.88) 
-0.2611** 
(-2.22) 
-0.2494** 
(-2.12) 
-0.2629** 
(-2.22) 
-0.4023** 
(-2.15) 
DE*dlnGt-1 -0.3104** 
(-2.45) 
-0.3099** 
(-2.43) 
-0.4114** 
(-2.33) 
-0.3157** 
(-2.50) 
-0.2995** 
(-2.36) 
-0.3086** 
(-2.43) 
-0.6047* 
(-2.81) 
DE*dlnGt-2 -0.1074 
(-0.96) 
-0.1014 
(-0.90) 
-0.1203 
(-0.79) 
-0.1041 
(-0.93) 
-0.1153 
(-1.03) 
-0.1063 
(-0.95) 
-0.1927 
(-0.99) 
τi*DE*dlnGt   --   -- -0.2515 
(-1.12) 
  --   --   -- 0.2596 
(1.12) 
τi*DE*dlnGt-1   --   -- 0.2145 
(0.88) 
  --   --   -- 0.4829‡ 
(1.87) 
τi*DE*dlnGt-2   --   -- 0.0205 
(0.09) 
  --   --   -- 0.1687 
(0.73) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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TABLE 4 
Estimates of St. Louis Equation, Including Trigger Points for Unusual Fiscal Events (continued) 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Trigger Dummy Variables (τi) Based on: 
        _________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Fiscal 
Con-
traction 
(DC) and 
Expansion 
(DE) 
Dummies 
Std. Dev. 
of the 
Public-
Sector 
Debt  
New Peak 
of the 
Public-
Sector 
Debt  
Std. Dev. 
of the 
Primary 
Structural 
Deficit  
New Peak 
of the 
Primary 
Structural 
Deficit  
Std. Dev. 
Of 
Govern-
ment Con-
sumption 
New Peak 
of 
Govern-
ment Con-
sumption  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
dlnTt 0.0925** 
(2.15) 
0.0921** 
(2.14) 
0.0959** 
(2.21) 
0.0877** 
(2.05) 
0.0937** 
(2.19) 
0.0978** 
(2.26) 
0.0916** 
(2.14) 
dlnTt-1 -0.0177 
(-0.44) 
-0.0199 
(-0.49) 
-0.0113 
(-0.28) 
-0.0236 
(-0.59) 
-0.0178 
(-0.44) 
-0.0189 
(-0.47) 
-0.0175 
(-0.44) 
dlnTt-2 -0.0066 
(-0.18) 
-0.0085 
(-0.23) 
-0.0074 
(-0.20) 
-0.0086 
(-0.23) 
-0.0073 
(-0.20) 
-0.0045 
(-0.12) 
-0.0150 
(-0.41) 
DC*dlnTt 0.0133 
(0.15) 
0.0379 
(0.42) 
0.3316‡ 
(1.65) 
-0.1448 
(-0.38) 
0.0058 
(0.42) 
0.0128 
(0.09) 
-0.1321 
(-0.85) 
DC*dlnTt-1 0.0356 
(0.35) 
0.0251 
(0.25) 
-0.4563** 
(-2.03) 
0.8230‡ 
(1.74) 
0.1074 
(0.87) 
-0.0561 
(-0.33) 
-0.0031 
(-0.02) 
DC*dlnTt-2 0.0537 
(0.57) 
0.0423 
(0.45) 
0.2083 
(0.95) 
0.5687 
(1.13) 
0.1942‡ 
(1.66) 
-0.0180 
(-0.11) 
0.0491 
(0.28) 
τi*DC*dlnTt   -- 0.6227 
(0.72) 
-0.3784‡ 
(-1.72) 
0.1747 
(0.45) 
0.0073 
(0.04) 
0.0110 
(0.06) 
0.2159 
(1.18) 
τi*DC*dlnT-1   -- 1.5879 
(0.61) 
0.6076** 
(2.47) 
-0.7967‡ 
(-1.66) 
-0.1208 
(-0.62) 
0.2122 
(1.02) 
0.1228 
(0.54) 
τi*DC*dlnTt-2   -- 0.6707 
(0.31) 
-0.1969 
(-0.82) 
-0.5108 
(-1.00) 
-0.3383‡ 
(-1.91) 
0.0496 
(0.26) 
0.0257 
(0.13) 
DE*dlnTt 0.1759‡‡ 
(1.43) 
0.1754‡‡ 
(1.42) 
0.1019 
(0.65) 
0.1833‡‡ 
(1.49) 
0.1662‡‡ 
(1.35) 
0.1722‡‡ 
(1.39) 
0.2765‡‡ 
(1.47) 
DE*dlnTt-1 0.3159** 
(2.41) 
0.3173** 
(2.41) 
0.3466** 
(1.97) 
0.3163** 
(2.42) 
0.3154** 
(2.41) 
0.3135** 
(2.38) 
0.6348* 
(2.82) 
DE*dlnTt-2 0.2049‡ 
(1.75) 
0.1946‡‡ 
(1.64) 
0.2554‡ 
(1.67) 
0.2004‡ 
(1.71) 
0.2118‡ 
(1.81) 
0.2060‡ 
(1.75) 
0.2570‡‡ 
(1.31) 
τi*DE*dlnTt   --   -- 0.0570 
(0.24) 
  --   --   -- -0.3453‡‡ 
(-1.43) 
τi*DE*dlnTt-1   --   -- -0.0303 
(-0.12) 
  --   --   -- -0.6242** 
(-2.31) 
τi*DE*dlnTt-2   --   -- -0.0460 
(-0.19) 
  --   --   -- -0.2151 
(-0.89) 
dlnXt 0.1584* 
(7.97) 
0.1598* 
(7.97) 
0.1588* 
(7.87) 
0.1585* 
(7.99) 
0.1576* 
(7.93) 
0.1574* 
(7.90) 
0.1528* 
(7.75) 
dlnXt-1 0.0656* 
(3.4655) 
0.0679* 
(3.55) 
0.0692* 
(3.57) 
0.0663* 
(3.51) 
0.0655* 
(3.46) 
0.0648* 
(3.41) 
0.0602* 
(3.17) 
dlnXt-2 0.0922* 
(5.06) 
0.0942* 
(5.13) 
0.0882* 
(4.77) 
0.0947* 
(5.21) 
0.0903* 
(4.92) 
0.0902* 
(4.93) 
0.0840* 
(4.59) 
R2 0.5837 0.5812 0.5804 0.5871 0.5868 0.5829 0.5950 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: See Table 3. The τis are the trigger dummy variables corresponding to the column heading. 
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TABLE 5 
Estimates of Consumption Equation 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable No Dummies Fiscal Contraction (DC) and 
Expansion (DE) Dummies 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ct-1 0.9816* 
(77.87) 
1.0027* 
(68.71) 
Xt-1 0.3448* 
(12.41) 
0.3135* 
(10.47) 
Gt-1 0.6055* 
(15.08) 
0.5414* 
(11.80) 
DC*Gt-1   -- 0.1767‡‡ 
(1.29) 
DE*Gt-1   -- -0.3623‡‡ 
(-1.46) 
Tt-1 -0.6664* 
(-19.69) 
-0.6103* 
(-15.66) 
DC*Tt-1   -- -0.1717‡ 
(-1.66) 
DE*Tt-1   -- 0.3141‡‡ 
(1.38) 
R2 0.9948 0.9949 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: See Table 3. The dependent variable is real consumption spending per capita. The independent variables C, 
X, G, and T, all lagged one year, are real consumption per capita, real exports per capita, real high-
employment spending per capita, and real high-employment revenue capita.  
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TABLE 6 
Estimates of Consumption Equation, Including Trigger Points for Unusual Fiscal Events 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Trigger Dummy Variables (τi) Based on: 
        _________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Fiscal 
Con-
traction 
(DC) and 
Expansion 
(DE) 
Dummies 
Std. Dev. 
of the 
Public-
Sector 
Debt  
New Peak 
of the 
Public-
Sector 
Debt  
Std. Dev. 
of the 
Primary 
Structural 
Deficit  
New Peak 
of the 
Primary 
Structural 
Deficit  
Std. Dev. 
Of 
Govern-
ment Con-
sumption 
New Peak 
of 
Govern-
ment Con-
sumption  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Ct-1 1.0027* 
(68.71) 
1.0025* 
(68.52) 
0.9983* 
(67.11) 
0.9912* 
(69.09) 
0.9741* 
(69.32) 
0.9947* 
(68.97) 
0.9938* 
(67.98) 
Xt-1 0.3135* 
(10.47) 
0.3138* 
(10.47) 
0.3211* 
(10.58) 
0.3361* 
(11.43) 
0.3305* 
(11.24) 
0.3301* 
(11.17) 
0.3308* 
(11.10) 
Gt-1 0.5414* 
(11.80) 
0.5418* 
(11.78) 
0.5509* 
(11.89) 
0.5672* 
(12.66) 
0.5607* 
(12.49) 
0.5598* 
(12.41) 
0.5614* 
(12.35) 
DC*Gt-1 0.1767‡‡ 
(1.29) 
0.1787‡‡ 
(1.30) 
-0.1586 
(-0.10) 
0.5783* 
(3.79) 
0.4837* 
(3.29) 
-1.0593* 
(-3.32) 
-1.4644‡ 
(-1.68) 
τi*DC*Gt-1   -- -0.6230 
(-0.04) 
0.3791 
(0.23) 
-1.5231* 
(-3.13) 
-1.5828** 
(-3.13) 
1.5011* 
(4.30) 
1.8436** 
(2.09) 
DE*Gt-1 -0.3623‡‡ 
(-1.46) 
-0.3625‡‡ 
(-1.46) 
-0.5295‡ 
(-1.86) 
-0.3827‡‡ 
(-1.59) 
-0.3777‡‡ 
(-1.56) 
-0.3773‡‡ 
(-1.56) 
-0.5611** 
(-1.97) 
τi*DE*Gt-1   --    -- 0.4985 
(0.63) 
   --    --    -- 0.5522 
(0.89) 
Tt-1 -0.6103* 
(-15.66) 
-0.6106* 
(-15.62) 
-0.6181* 
(-15.71) 
-0.6325* 
(-16.61) 
-0.6270* 
(-16.42) 
-0.6264* 
(-16.34) 
-0.6274* 
(-16.26) 
DC*Tt-1 -0.1717‡ 
(-1.66) 
-0.1731‡ 
(-1.67) 
0.0009 
(0.00) 
-0.4687* 
(-4.09) 
-0.4004* 
(-3.62) 
0.8910* 
(3.61) 
1.0717** 
(2.55) 
τi*DC*Tt-1   -- -0.0314 
(0.00) 
-0.2024 
(-0.13) 
1.2329* 
(5.44) 
1.2243* 
(4.39) 
-1.2587* 
(-4.70) 
-1.3932* 
(-3.22) 
DE*Tt-1 0.3141‡‡ 
(1.38) 
0.3145‡‡ 
(1.37) 
0.5154‡ 
(1.83) 
0.3397‡‡ 
(1.54) 
0.3333‡‡ 
(1.50) 
0.3325‡‡ 
(1.49) 
0.5450‡ 
(1.95) 
τi* DE*Tt-1   --    -- -0.5277 
(-0.81) 
   --    --    -- -0.5709 
(-1.07) 
R2 0.9949 0.9949 0.9949 0.9952 0.9952 0.9951 0.9951 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: See Tables 3 and 4. The τis are the trigger dummy variables corresponding to the column heading. 
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TABLE 7 
Estimates of Growth Equation 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variable No Dummies Fiscal Contraction (DC) and 
Expansion (DE) Dummies 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
ln  yt − 1 -0.0261* 
(-4.68) 
-0.0239* 
(-4.25) 
invt  0.0705‡ 
(1.83) 
0.0629‡‡ 
(1.60) 
dlnpopt -0.6691* 
(-8.87) 
-0.6736* 
(-8.97) 
gt -0.0017* 
(-4.17) 
-0.0018* 
(-3.58) 
DC*gt   --  -0.0002 
(-0.19) 
DE*gt   -- 0.0003 
(0.25) 
tt 0.0005 
(1.13) 
0.0010‡ 
(1.77) 
DC*tt   -- -0.0017‡ 
(-1.77) 
DE*tt   -- -0.0013 
(-1.12) 
dlnHt 0.0117‡ 
(1.67) 
0.0117‡ 
(1.66) 
R2 0.2367 0.2450 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: See Table 3. The dependent variable is the rate of growth of real GDP per capita. The independent 
variables lny, inv, dlnpop, g, t, and dlnH are the natural logarithm of real GDP per capita, the ratio of 
investment to GDP, the population growth rate, the ratio of high-employment spending to potential GDP, 
the ratio of high-employment revenue to potential GDP, and the base money growth rate. 
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TABLE 8 
Estimates of Growth Equation, Including Trigger Points for Unusual Fiscal Events 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Trigger Dummy Variables (τi) Based on: 
        _________________________________________________________________ 
Variable Fiscal 
Con-
traction 
(DC) and 
Expansion 
(DE) 
Dummies 
Std. Dev. 
of the 
Public-
Sector 
Debt  
New Peak 
of the 
Public-
Sector 
Debt  
Std. Dev. 
of the 
Primary 
Structural 
Deficit  
New Peak 
of the 
Primary 
Structural 
Deficit  
Std. Dev. 
Of 
Govern-
ment Con-
sumption 
New Peak 
of 
Govern-
ment Con-
sumption  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
ln  yt − 1 -0.0239* 
(-4.25) 
-0.0237* 
(-4.25) 
-0.0238* 
(-4.20) 
-0.0239** 
(-4.24) 
-0.0239* 
(-4.25) 
-0.0236* 
(-4.20) 
-0.0219* 
(-3.84) 
invt  0.0629‡‡ 
(1.60) 
0.0763‡ 
(1.94) 
0.0576‡‡ 
(1.46) 
0.0631‡‡ 
(1.61) 
0.0651‡‡ 
(1.63) 
0.0599‡‡ 
(1.52) 
0.0471 
(1.18) 
dlnpopt -0.6736* 
(-8.97) 
-0.6759* 
(-9.06) 
-0.6729* 
(-8.96) 
-0.6733* 
(-8.95) 
-0.6752* 
(-8.98) 
-0.6733* 
(-8.97) 
-0.6769* 
(-9.07) 
gt -0.0018* 
(-3.58) 
-0.0018* 
(-3.61) 
-0.0018* 
(-3.58) 
-0.0018* 
(-3.57) 
-0.0017* 
(-3.57) 
-0.0018* 
(-3.57) 
-0.0018* 
(-3.57) 
DC*gt -0.0002 
(-0.19) 
-0.0011 
(-1.00) 
0.0026 
(0.97) 
-0.0007 
(-0.28) 
0.0001 
(0.06) 
0.0008 
(0.50) 
0.0006 
(0.35) 
τi*DC*gt   -- 0.0063** 
(2.44) 
-0.0035 
(-1.24) 
0.0006 
(0.21) 
-0.0003 
(-0.16) 
-0.0021 
(-1.11) 
-0.0013 
(-0.66) 
DE*gt 0.0003 
(0.25) 
0.0003 
(0.33) 
-0.0001 
(-0.06) 
0.0003 
(0.26) 
0,0003 
(0.27) 
0.0002 
(0.23) 
-0.0007 
(-0.57) 
τi*DE*gt   --   -- 0.0013 
(0.52) 
   --    --    -- 0.0027‡‡ 
(1.40) 
tt 0.0010‡ 
(1.77) 
0.0011‡ 
(1.90) 
0.0010‡ 
(1.72) 
0.0010‡ 
(1.77) 
0.0010‡ 
(1.78) 
0.0010‡ 
(1.73) 
0.0009‡‡ 
(1.56) 
DC*tt -0.0017‡ 
(-1.77) 
-0.0014‡‡ 
(-1.36) 
-0.0039‡‡ 
(-1.47) 
-0.0018 
(-1.01) 
-0.0022‡‡ 
(-1.49) 
-0.0020‡‡ 
(-1.32) 
-0.0022‡‡ 
(-1.51) 
τi*DC*tt   -- -0.0008 
(-0.30) 
0.0023 
(0.83) 
0.0001 
(0.06) 
0.0010 
(0.55) 
0.0002 
(0.13) 
0.0008 
(0.45) 
DE*tt -0.0013 
(-1.12) 
-0.0014 
(-1.18) 
-0.0014 
(-1.13) 
-0.0013 
(-1.11) 
-0.0013 
(-1.12) 
-0.0013 
(-1.10) 
-0.0020‡‡ 
(-1.37) 
τ *Di E*tt   --    -- 0.0007 
(0.26) 
   -    --    -- 0.0010 
(0.46) 
dlnHt 0.0117‡ 
(1.66) 
0.0122‡ 
(1.75) 
0.0119‡ 
(1.69) 
0.0116‡ 
(1.65) 
0.0115‡‡ 
(1.64) 
0.0116‡ 
(1.65) 
0.0134‡ 
(1.91) 
R2 0.2450 0.2549 0.2450 0.2420 0.2425 0.2453 0.2543 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: See Tables 3 and 6. The τis are the trigger dummy variables corresponding to the column heading. 
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